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Abstract: Here we propose a compatibilist theory of free will, in the tradition of naturalized 
philosophy, that attempts: 1) to provide a synthesis of a variety of well-known theories, 
capable of addressing problems of the latter; 2) to account for the fact that free will comes in 
degrees; 3) to interface with natural sciences, especially neurobiology. We argue that free will 
comes in degrees, as suggested by neuroscience. We suggest that a concept that can precisely 
‘measure’ the variability of free will is that of ‘theory’, or rather, the capacity to make 
assumptions and use theories. Our model, then, highlights that free-willed actions are 
consciously monitored by the agent, through beliefs, assumptions and ultimately theories – 
hence the CMT model (for Conscious-through-Monitoring-through-Theories). The ultimate 
goal of this attempt at synthesis is to make the comparison with a variety of well-known 
accounts, and to show that our model can address several of their problems.  
 
     
1. Introduction. Approach used.  
 
The question whether humans have free will is an all-time classic of philosophy; a staggering 
number of ‘great minds’ from all disciplines have expressed their opinion on it. Two typical positions in 
the debate are hard determinism and libertarianism (cf. Fischer et al. 2007, Griffith 2013, Kane 2005 and 
2012, Mele 2009, O'Connor and Franklin 2018, Pereboom 1997, Walter 2001, Watson 2003). Hard 
determinists reject free will on the hypothesis that all events, including our choices, are predetermined 
(fixed) by the laws of nature and the past; libertarians accept free will as a given and reject determinism. 
According to typical hard determinists free will would largely be an illusion, fuelled by our obvious feeling 
of being free, and entertained by our obvious incapacity to process all factors influencing us (and thus by 
our incapacity to predict in detail what will happen to us). Many professional philosophers however are 
compatibilists, maybe even a majority as claimed in (Pereboom 1997, p. 242): according to this position, 
determinism and free will are not in contradiction.  
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The model we elaborate here is compatibilist. We have presented arguments in favor of 
determinism elsewhere (Vervoort 2013), but our compatibilist view will actually appear to be independent 
of whether our universe is deterministic or indeterministic; hence our model could also appeal to 
proponents of indeterminism. Our theory is based on an advanced biophilosophical account of 
consciousness developed by Mahner and Bunge (1997). We adhere in the following to a naturalized 
philosophy, sympathetic to interaction with natural sciences (for recent works expounding the merits of 
naturalized philosophy, see e.g. Ladyman and Ross 2007, Mahner and Bunge 1997, Walter 2001). Thus 
we will in the conclusion briefly sketch how our model could be instrumental for some scientific 
disciplines, in particular neurobiology and computer science.  
One goal is to construct a ‘minimal’ model in the sense that we aim to identify the minimal set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions to term an act ‘free-willed’ or ‘free’. In this endeavor we use classic 
tools of analytic philosophy. However, we may be less typical in our attempt to synthesize prominent 
theories of free will. With synthesis, we mean the attempt (or its result) of showing how different 
established and efficient theories can be derived from one and the same unified model; more realistically, 
how the essential ingredients of different established models resort under one umbrella model. We believe 
that in the free will debate, millennia old, analytic philosophy has invested such enormous efforts and has 
made, especially the last fifty to sixty years, such progress in conceptual clarity, that efforts at synthesis 
are now well justified. This is so on the condition, of course, that the resulting synthetic model can solve 
worries where isolated accounts remain silent or powerless. Also, let us note that in natural science, 
especially physics, synthesis – or ‘unification’ as is it is termed there – of different assumptions and 
theories is recognized as the key principle for theory-building; we do not see any good reason why this 
could not be so in philosophy. Thus we insist that our model should be judged on its results, namely the 
fact that it can tackle problems that have been identified in competing modern theories, as shown in 
Section 7. Each of the ingredients or components of our model will appear necessary to address these 
problems.   
Methodologically, our synthetic and ‘naturalized’ approach is inspired by, and can be compared 
to, the work of philosopher and neuroscientist Henrik Walter (2001), who proposes a component theory 
of maximal libertarian free will: a theory with essentially three requirements that a libertarian would 
demand of a ‘free’ act (in short, alternativism, intelligibility and agency). Walter has done an extensive 
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literature review to show that his component theory covers a wide spectrum of the most relevant modern 
theories and issues on free will; hence the relevance of benchmarking our model to Walter’s1.  
Regarding the content of our model, our most conspicuous influences come from A. J. Ayer 
(1954/1997), and, especially, M. Mahner and M. Bunge (1997), as explained in Sections 4 and 5. These 
authors develop theories of which essential ideas can be traced back to such fore-runners of the philosophy 
of free will as Aristotle and Aquinas. In Section 6 we will show in detail how these models can be 
combined into our favorite model, which we propose to term the CMT-model of free will (for ‘Conscious-
through-Monitoring-through-Theories’).  
We will argue that one advantage of this model is that it captures a feature of free will we believe 
is essential, namely that free will comes in degrees. The variability of free will has been hinted to by 
neurobiologists (e.g. Brembs 2011), and convincingly analyzed by philosophers (O’Connor 2009); we 
will present our own arguments in Section 3, after explicitly stating our background assumptions in 
Section 2. Our model suggests, as far as we know for the first time, a qualitative ‘measure’ for this 
variability of free will (Section 6). As said, we will also show that this model can be related to, and 
synthetically explain salient properties of, very recent theories, notably those of Frankfurt (1996, 1988), 
Wolf (1990), Fischer and Ravizza (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, Fischer et al. 2007) and Walter (2001). Of 
course, we can here only make a succinct comparison with these elaborated theories (Section 7).  
 
2. Background assumptions. 
  
Maybe it is useful to explicitly state our background assumptions. First of all, we assume that our 
mental activity, our thoughts, choices, feelings etc., have a neurological, and ultimately chemical-physical 
basis in the brain: mental states correspond to neural (super)networks, mental acts are brain processes 
(Mahner and Bunge 1997, Walter 2001). Based on the famous Libet experiment and other neuroscientific 
experiments (showing for instance that ‘free’ choices can be predicted up to eight seconds before the 
subject’s conscious action, cf. Soon et al. 2008), many, but certainly not all, neuroscientists favor a 
deterministic interpretation in the free will debate. This is an argument for us to look for a compatibilist 
                                                          
1 Walter himself is not a libertarian; in his book he tests the three ingredients of libertarian free will against natural science, in 
particular neuroscience. He argues that neuroscience does not really support alternativism (the hypothesis that ‘at the atomic 
scale’, i.e. taking all physical facts into account, a human brain has, at any given time, real alternatives to choose between – cf. 
Walter 2001). So Walter is not in favor of strong libertarianism but shows that versions of intelligibility and agency do find 
support in neuroscience. We assume from the start, as compatibilists and determinists, that alternativism is eliminated.  
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model. In physics the orthodox position is that at the quantum level nature is probabilistic and therefore 
indeterministic. But a detailed scrutiny shows that this assumption is heavily metaphysically tainted and 
that the debate is undecided (Wuethrich 2011, Vervoort 2013). Simply stated, physical determinism is the 
assumption that given all physical data of the universe at any given moment t0, and given the laws of 
nature, there is only one possible future after t0. In other words, all events, including all mental events, are 
determined, caused, fixed by preceding events. Many determinists conclude from this we do not really 
have robust alternatives (alternativism is false) even if we feel we have. This would mean, in particular, 
that we do not have the ‘ultimate’ kind of free will that a typical libertarian assumes, the free will of a 
‘mind’ that could make a real difference, could make a genuine choice at t0, largely independently of the 
events preceding t0. But some important form of free will may still exist; which form is the object of study 
of this article. 
 
3. A preliminary observation: free will comes in degrees. 
 
Technically speaking, our goal is to construct a definition of a ‘free-willed’ act by a human, in the 
form of necessary and sufficient conditions. Hence we aim at identifying the conditions C1, C2, C3,… 
such that ‘Person P does act A of his own free will’ if and only if (IFF) C1, C2, C3,… are satisfied. The 
Ci are all necessary conditions and they are jointly sufficient to imply free will. As announced, and 
remembering Occam’s razor, we are looking for the minimal, most economic set {C1, C2, C3,…}. Finally, 
we look for conditions that are compatible with determinism. They will also appear to be compatible with 
indeterminism; compatibilist models can have this feature. Therefore our definition would survive even if 
the universe would be indeterministic.  
But we would also like our model to say something about a feature of free will that seems important 
to us, namely its variability. Consider your favorite dog, playing in the garden, and suddenly seeing the 
neighbour’s cat appear. You shout: Aristotle, stay put ! For a fraction of a second Aristotle remains 
motionless, throws a guilty glance at you, and then hurries after the cat. Has Aristotle free will ? Could 
Aristotle have done otherwise, has he alternatives ? Maybe, but most philosophers agree that free will, 
and certainly the free will needed for moral responsibility2, is essentially a human thing (if it exists at all). 
                                                          
2 Note that this article is not about moral responsibility. We leave the link between free will and moral responsibility 
unspecified; we minimally declare we are interested in ‘high level free will’, typically understood by philosophers as required 
for moral responsibility. 
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But granted, one might say that Aristotle, the dog, possesses an embryonic version of free will. Has a new-
born child free will ? A foetus ? No, most would say. When, then, does a child start having free will ? If a 
normal adult has free will, and if free will is linked to brain activity – a brain activity that grows 
continuously more complex when a foetus and new-born child evolve into an adult – than it seems one 
inevitably comes to the conclusion that free will comes in continuous degrees. This is, we believe, a rather 
innocuous conclusion, that has been noted before (O’Connor 2009) and with which many philosophers 
could agree, we believe – especially in the naturalized philosophy tradition3. Since this hypothesis will be 
highly instrumental in the following, we term it the ‘degree-thesis’. Simply put: free will comes in degrees; 
in other words the mental capacity of free will is something that admits of (continuous) variations or 
gradations, something that a human (and generally speaking an animal) can have to greater or lesser extent 
– moreover an extent that can vary with time within an agent, as noted in (O’Connor 2009). Another way 
to understand this variability is to realize that animals have continuously evolved from bacteria over 
invertebrates, fishes, amphibians, reptiles, small mammals to primitive human species to modern Homo 
sapiens, and that somewhere in this evolution, paralleling a steady increase in brain complexity, free will 
must have appeared, not suddenly, but evolving in the same continuous way as the brain did. We will have 
much more to say on this in a moment. Indeed, we suggest that there exists a concept that can ‘measure’ 
this continuous progression. 
 
4. A basic definition of free will (Ayer model). 
  
Let us now start our main task and look for the simplest non-trivial compatibilist model of free 
will; this simplest model can however not solve certain problems and will have to be completed in a 
following stage. A considerable part of the academic debate on free will has turned around the ‘principle 
of alternative possibilities’ (PAP) (Frankfurt 1969, Kane 2005). According to the PAP, a person P does 
act A of his/her own free will only if P could have acted otherwise than doing A (this ‘only-if’ condition 
is then a necessary condition for free will). Most libertarians embrace the PAP as a proof that free will 
excludes determinism. But it is well known there are considerable problems with the characterization of 
free will provided by the PAP. Notably, Frankfurt has provided counterexamples, in which he presents 
                                                          
3 O’Connor (2009) arrives at the conclusion of variability of free will by an independent route, notably by observing that agents 
can be, to lesser or greater extent, consciously aware of the factors guiding their choices. As will be seen further, this – in our 
view highly relevant – observation can well be fitted to our final model developed in Sections 6-7.  
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cases in which P could not have acted otherwise, while he still acts of free will; hence the PAP would be 
false (Frankfurt 1969, 1988). These arguments have been criticized in turn (e.g. Widerker and McKenna 
2003); a detailed overview of the most recent developments in this intense debate can be found in 
(O'Connor and Franklin 2018). We believe it is fair to say that this matter is undecided.    
A classic compatibilist attempt to defuse the worries related to the PAP was given in a well-known 
article by A. J. Ayer (1954/1997). The article famously argues that the capacity to choose as invoked in 
the PAP may well be guaranteed by the simple requirement that subject P acts without constraint. In its 
simplest expression, an act of free will, for Ayer, is an act that is not under constraint – an idea that traces 
back at least to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book III). In some more detail, we can extract following 
analytic definition of free will from Ayer’s article. ‘P acts of his own free will’ is essentially equivalent to 
‘P acts without constraint’, more precisely: 
 
DEF-A: ‘P acts of his own free will’ IFF 
i. P is not compelled by other persons;  
ii. there is no habitual ascendancy over P by other persons; and  
iii. P acts voluntarily.  
 
Ayer leaves the concept of ‘voluntary act’, again a notion that goes back to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book III), rather imprecise; therefore we will have to come back to it in a moment. But from the text it 
follows that at least one ingredient of ‘voluntary’ is: not being under constraint of an abnormal mental 
condition such as a mania, a neurosis etc. (Ayer 1954 / 1997). Can an act that is not constrained and thus 
‘free’ according to (i) – (iii) also be free in the sense of the PAP, in other words, could the unconstrained 
P also ‘have done otherwise’? Ayer famously answers in the affirmative; he construes ‘P could have acted 
otherwise’ as follows: A) P was not constrained in the sense above (no-one compelled P and the act was 
done in a ‘normal’ psychological condition) and B) P would have acted otherwise if P had so chosen. 
 Sure, this construal is far from universally accepted (cf. the review in O'Connor and Franklin 2018, 
Section 2.2); but what is essential for us is that it appears that DEF-A can be supplemented in order to 
address worries of much more sophisticated recent theories, as argued in Section 7. Therefore we take 
DEF-A as a minimal analytic starting point. (Even if this is not essential at this point, one could then also 
adopt Ayer’s construal of ‘could…’ as ‘would… if…’ as plausible, also because it is compatible with 
determinism (Ayer 1954/1997). Note that the same holds for clause A): P can be unconstrained in the 
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quite common sense (i) – (iii) even if everything is determined. In Ayer’s words, free will should be 
contrasted with constraint, not determinism.) For the time being we retain: there are respectable arguments 
that an act of free will can be characterized in terms of absence of constraint in the sense (i) – (iii), with 
the proviso that we would like to know more about what ‘voluntary’ means in (iii). 
Still, it is clear for other reasons that DEF-A cannot be the whole story. We can repeat an argument 
we already invoked above: ‘real free will’ should be something more than just ‘unconstrained will that 
has the ability of choosing between options’, because it seems that even animals could have this type of 
will – recall Aristotle the playful dog. But as most philosophers we ascribe ‘real’ free will only to humans.  
What, then, is the feature that distinguishes humans most clearly from animals ? There is a long 
philosophical tradition related to this question, but it is presumably uncontroversial to identify 
consciousness, the capacity to think, rationality, as the key element of distinction. Then, something of this 
should enter the definition of free will. And indeed, consciousness and/or rationality seem implicit in 
Ayer’s concept of voluntariness, as an ingredient of free will, as also follows from early analyses of the 
concept of voluntariness by Aristotle and Aquinas (cf. excerpts in the anthology Pereboom 1997, Ch. 1 
and Ch. 5). We therefore should find a model for this essential but admittedly somewhat vague concept. 
 
5. Voluntariness and consciousness (Mahner-Bunge model). 
 
To analyze voluntariness, the most developed naturalized model we are aware of is proposed in 
Mahner and Bunge (1997). In their ‘Foundations of Biophilosophy’ the authors attempt a penetrating and 
wide-ranging approach with the aim to provide an axiomatic theory of key concepts of biology including 
psychobiology. Their approach and methods are eminently science-compatible, and their background 
assumptions coincide with ours (cf. Section 2 and below). In Chapter 6, on psychobiology, Mahner and 
Bunge (MB henceforth) propose an analysis of concepts as mind, mind-body interaction, consciousness, 
self, voluntariness, free will etc. We will give here a succinct overview of the notions we need for the 
derivation of our free will model. Clearly, MB’s axiomatic and formalized approach is only one possible 
theoretical framework for the above concepts; but it seems to us their hypotheses and well-structured 
theory are programmatic and heuristically powerful, notably for comparison with neurobiology and 
computer science. We will only retain the essence, and occasionally make small changes as indicated. 
MB closely link the mind with the neuronal states and networks in the human brain; mind and soul 
are not conceived of as immaterial, spiritual, perhaps immortal entities. In this theory the mind of an 
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animal is construed as the union, the set of all mental processes of its brain4. More precisely, Mahner and 
Bunge propose following definition, reproduced here literally (MB 1997 p. 205): 
 
DEF-MB-1. Let P denote a plastic neuronal supersystem of animal b of species K. Then the mind 
of b during the period  is the union of all the mental processes (specific functions s) that 
components of P, i.e., plastic neuronal systems n, engage in during . More precisely, 
M(b, ) = ∪n s(n, ). 
  
The other key concepts, plastic neuronal (super)system, mental process, mental function, are also defined 
in (MB 1997 Ch. 6). However simple, this theory allows to address some of the old, paradigmatic problems 
of the philosophy of mind. One such question is: where is the mind ? Strictly speaking, the mind is 
nowhere, since it is a set, hence a conceptual object; only brains, whether minding or not, are somewhere 
(MB p. 207). Further, according to this model there can be no real mind-body dualism, thus avoiding an 
old stumbling block of philosophy, neither mind-body interaction – as opposed to brain-body interaction. 
MB explain in following passage (MB 1997 p. 206):  
“There can be no mind-matter interaction because – unlike individual mental processes and brains 
– mind and matter are sets, hence conceptual objects. However, it does make sense to speak of 
‘mental-bodily interactions’ provided this expression is taken to abbreviate ‘interactions among 
plastic neuronal systems, on the one hand, and either committed neuronal systems or bodily 
systems that are not part of the Central Neuronal System on the other’. Thus, there are interactions 
between sensory and motor areas, between ideational neuronal systems and external receptors, 
between the cortical and subcortical regions of the brain, between the brain and the endocrine 
and immune system, and so on. Because mental events are neural events, and because the causal 
relation is defined for pairs of events in concrete systems (recall Sect. 1.9), we have:  
Corollary 6.5.: Mental events can cause nonmental events in the same body, and v.v.  
Consequently, disturbances of nonmental biofunctions may influence mental states and, 
conversely, mental events such as acts of will may influence nonmental bodily states. This is 
what neurochemistry, neurology, psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine, 
psychoneuropharmacology, education, and propaganda are all about”.  
 
                                                          
4 Of course, in this context the notion of set, a concept of formalized logic, is not the most user-friendly one, at any rate other 
less formal conceptualizations are also possible. But we do believe the MB-model is the most economic model that can explain 
so much. For the moment we just ask the reader to bear with us, and to judge later, based on the problems that can be addressed.   
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In a similar vein and building on the above assumptions one can then define consciousness, termed the 
highest of all brain functions by Bunge and Mahner (MB 1997 p. 209). First they define (we only slightly 
modify their phrasing):  
 
DEF-MB-2. A conscious mental process / choice / act (conceived as based on, governed by, a 
mental process) is a mental process / choice / act that is monitored (recorded, analyzed, 
controlled, or kept track of) by some other mental activity in the same brain.  
 
Simply put: for a mental process or act to be conscious, it must be thought about by a higher part of the 
brain5. And further (MB 1997 p. 209):  
 
DEF-MB-3. The consciousness of an animal b is the set of all the states (or, rather, processes) of 
the brain of b in which b is conscious of some perception or thought in b itself. 
 
(This is not a circular definition thanks to DEF-MB-2.) MB explain: 
 
“According to this convention, an animal can only be conscious of some of its own higher mental 
processes: not just feeling, sensing, and doing, but also thinking of what it perceives or thinks. 
An animal conscious of mental process x (in itself) possibly undergoes (either in parallel or in 
quick succession) two different mental processes: x – the object mental process or content of its 
consciousness, and thinking about x – i.e., being conscious about x.” (MB 1997 p. 208-209) 
 
Using DEF-MB-2, one can now construct a definition of the voluntary act as invoked for instance by 
Aristotle, Aquinas and Ayer (MB 1997 p. 210).  
 
DEF-MB-4. An animal act is voluntary (or intentional) IFF it is a conscious purposeful act.  
 
‘Purposeful’ is left undefined, but is self-explaining; and, for that matter, it seems less essential to us since 
it seems that a choice or conscious act can always be associated with a purpose. And finally (MB 1997, p. 
211):     
                                                          
5 To us, it seems a priori a quite acceptable hypothesis, in the light of neuroscientific findings showing that the cognitive center 
of the brain, the prefrontal cortex, is connected to large parts of the brain and seems to function as the ‘integrator’ of information 
embedded in very many other mental processes. This is the neurobiological intuition that lies at the basis of MB’s intuition that 
consciousness of X is related to ‘thinking about X by a higher level part of the brain’ – presumably the prefrontal cortex. 
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DEF-MB-5: An animal acts of its own free will IFF 
i. its action is voluntary; and 
ii. it has free choice of its goal(s) – i.e., is under no programmed or external compulsion to 
attain the chosen goal.  
 
In essence, we find in clause (ii) the absence of constraint that is the essential condition for Ayer and 
others. And ‘voluntary’ in clause (i) and in DEF-A (iii) is now explained by DEF-MB-4: it means 
conscious and purposeful. Therefore, to our satisfaction, we find that Mahner, Bunge and Ayer define free 
will in a very similar manner, moreover a manner that can well be related to a majority of compatibilist 
theories on free will, as will be shown further. Let us for the moment omit the notion of purpose in 
voluntary (which seems less essential and can be seen to be contained in the notion of ‘choice’). Then we 
can synthesize Ayer’s and MB’s models as follows.  
 
DEF-MBA. Action A by animal b is ‘free-willed’ or ‘free’ (is made of b’s own free will)  
IFF 
i. the action A is unconstrained (no programmed or external compulsion), and 
ii. the action A is conscious in that the action (linked to a mental process) is monitored 
(recorded, analyzed, controlled, or kept track of) by some other mental activity in the 
brain of b. 
 
So we have specified, with MB, that no-constraint is essentially absence of constraint by external agents 
and by externally programmed influences. We could now define ‘free will’ as the capacity to perform 
free-willed actions in the sense of DEF-MBA. 
 It is worth mentioning that DEF-MBA is, luckily, in a long historical lineage. Notably, it comes 
close to Aristotle’s view on free will, but it is also meaningfully linked to Kant’s (see further). Aristotle 
conceived of free will as a capacity to make choices that are unconstrained and not made of ignorance (cf.  
excerpts in Pereboom 1997, Ch. 1). The latter idea can well be linked to clause (ii) of DEF-MBA, as we 
will detail in a moment. Thus, we see appearing in this model of free will the component of consciousness 
that we intuitively suspected from the start to be an ingredient of free will – simply by recognizing or 
assuming that ‘real’ free will cannot be attributed to lower animals and is typically a human thing. 
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A second important thesis we started from is that free will comes in degrees. We posited this 
degree-thesis essentially by recognizing that there must be a (continuous) evolution in free will from 
primitive humans to modern humans, and from a new-born child to a knowledgeable adult. A logical 
question to ask is then: which concepts in DEF-MBA admit of degree ? Constraint, but more 
conspicuously the notions of analysis and control in clause (ii)6. 
 
6. Elaboration of the MBA-model. Is there a ‘measure’ of the variability of free will ?  
 
 If free will comes in degrees, a natural question is: can one then define a measure of the variability 
of free will ? A related question that brings this matter sharply to the point is: can we define a maximal 
form of free will – maximal in the sense of optimal, most adequate ? Especially the second question seems 
complex and touchy; it is largely absent from the modern debate, but it did peak through in the views on 
free will of some of the ancients and Kant. We will use the second question as a heuristic even if 
speculative tool to try to answer the first one.   
 To highlight the relevance of this problem, let us look at a case mentioned in (Griffith 2013 p. 33). 
Suppose a young girl, Trina, lives in a closed community that taught her from her early childhood that 
stealing from people outside the community is praiseworthy, the thing to do. Suppose that on her first day 
at school Trina happily puts her worldview to practice and steals several objects from her little 
schoolmates. Does Trina do these acts of her free will ? As argued by Griffith, in this case many people 
would accept that Trina was brainwashed (to some degree), and that she is not really blameworthy because 
she did not know any better. Thus, many would believe that Trina has no real free will. This is also what 
the MBA-model says: while stealing Trina can surely be conscious of it (she may perform some more or 
less conscious analysis of some of her deeds, there may be a little voice in her head saying: “yes, stealing 
from these girls is cool”), but at the same time there is a programmed constraint acting, in the sense that 
she was brainwashed by parents and community. So it is clause (i) that implies that her act of stealing is 
not free-willed. But again, it seems clear that the notion of degree of free will is helpful here: one could 
say that Trina’s behaviour is free to some degree, but not an optimal one. She is constrained by some 
(harsh or mild) form of brainwashing; and, especially, she monitors, analyzes, controls her deeds by a sub-
                                                          
6 In general the ‘consciousness’ of clause (ii) can vary; this comes close, or can at least interestingly be compared, to the account 
of O’Connor (2009). 
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optimal hypothesis or worldview (namely that stealing is praiseworthy). To make a link with what follows: 
she does not seem to use the optimal assumptions or ‘theory’ to monitor, analyze and control her deeds. 
 Now to our question whether an optimal form of free will could be defined. As said, this matter is 
not the main concern of this article; we ponder rather superficially about this question to find inspiration 
for our initial problem. It seems that DEF-MBA does hint to a possibility to qualify ‘adequate’ free will. 
Answering this question amounts to construing the maximal forms of analysis and control that 
consciousness, our brain, can perform when ‘monitoring’ an act, a choice, a decision. Having analyzed 
cases as those of Trina and many others, we believe the most synthetic concept to identify the maximal 
form of analysis and control is that of ‘theory’. We use ‘theory’ here in a very broad sense, including 
scientific and academic theories (ethical, philosophical, sociological, political, physical,…) but more 
generally also belief systems, including every-day beliefs and assumptions7; (coherent) bodies of 
information; worldviews; etc. We introduce the concept of ‘theory*’ to define theory in this broad sense. 
The link with analysis and control is then not far to seek: in a sense, it seems it may be said that one always 
analyzes and controls a conscious act, choice or decision with reference to, or within, a theory*. This 
seems obvious when making decisions that need the input of expert ‘intellectual’ knowledge, but even 
when making a banal choice, say whether to go to the cinema or to visit a friend on an idle Thursday 
evening, one ‘analyzes’ or ‘contemplates’ both alternatives within certain beliefs, using certain 
assumptions – for instance assumptions about the satisfaction each activity will provide. (Sure, the 
analysis may be barely conscious and ultra-rapid in this example; but we already agreed that being-
conscious-of comes in degrees.) But to identify ‘maximal analysis’ and ‘maximal free will’, we better 
look not at banal cases but at ethically or intellectually demanding ones. And then it seems quite clear 
what optimal, most adequate analysis means: namely analysis within the ‘optimal theory’ – the best theory 
that we have or have not at hand; the best-informed or most adequate assumptions on which to base our 
free choice or decision. Sure, in many cases it is not clear what the best theory is, but then, in many cases 
it is8. In short, according to the above analysis maximal free will is free will using the optimal beliefs, 
                                                          
7 Note that the link between ‘theory’ and ‘assumptions’ is extremely intimate: any real-world theory, say a theory from physics 
or ethics, is based on assumptions. Very simply put: a theory is a set of assumptions and of consequences that are logically 
derived from the former.  
8 If one wishes, in cases when the ‘optimal theory’ is unknown, one may consider ‘optimal theory’ as an idealized, hypothetical 
concept, something as a hypothetical extrapolation of existing provisional theories. In natural science for instance, it is current 
practice to talk about ‘future better theories’; in physics mathematical theorems are formulated regarding the features of these 
‘more optimal’ future theories, such as Bell’s theorem. In sum, there seems little doubt that this notion of optimal theory is 
operationally useful: one often can well know which theory or assumptions are better than others (for a given end); the optimal 
theory (in the absolute sense) corresponds to the extrapolated, hypothetical end product of this progress. Philosophy and natural 
science are full of this idealized concept, even if we likely will never know the ultimate theories.  
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assumptions, theories*, free will that is based on using the optimal theories and assumptions in our 
decision making. In an ethical context: the best moral theories and principles.  
 Now, as a first indication that we might be on the right track, notice that this conclusion rather 
closely fits to what Kant thought about free will in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1786/1983). Here Kant states, notably: “a free will and a will under moral laws become one and the same” 
(Kant 1786/1983 BA98, cited and discussed in Walter 2001, p. 5). Thus for Kant, real free will is, in 
essence, will under moral law. In our parlance: will in accordance with (monitored, controlled by) 
adequate moral assumptions / theories*. 
Now talking about ‘optimal theories’ might frighten some philosophers; remember though that we 
are obviously not looking for criteria for optimal or even valid theories; nor assuming that there always 
exist theories – in the narrow sense – for a given context. Importantly: one may not believe in the existence 
of ‘optimal theories’ while accepting the variability of free will, the point we want to make. Indeed, we 
were trying, initially, to identify a measure for the variability of free will – and we used the speculative 
reasoning above about what ‘optimal’ assumptions / theories could be merely as a heuristic tool for finding 
an answer to the initial question. We hope that the result is clear by now: we suggest that what varies in 
our capacity to perform actions that are free according to DEF-MBA is the ‘adequacy’ of the theories* 
we use to monitor these actions. In other words, the assumptions and belief systems involved in monitoring 
a free act are more or less adequate for guiding these acts. It is in this sense that one can say that Trina (in 
the above example) does not seem to use the optimal assumptions or ‘theory’ to monitor, analyze and 
control her deeds. 
 As said, these are first considerations on this topic of the measure of the variability of free will; in 
the following we will not discuss and use the complex notion of optimal free will / optimal theory 
anymore. But we will adopt the MBA-model with the extra assumption that, in clause (ii), the monitoring 
(analyzing, controlling) of the conscious brain involves theories* (in a wide sense), and that these 
theories* have an adequacy that admits of a degree.  
 Here we will term our enhanced MBA-model the ‘CMT-model of free will’ (free will as the 
capacity to perform actions that are Conscious-through-Monitoring-through-Theories*, in short). In the 
following Section our goal is to show the potential of this model to subsume other, in particular recent, 
theories of free will, and solve problems of these other models. We focus on compatibilist theories as ours. 
As an additional benefit, we will briefly suggest how our naturalized approach can interface with new 
research questions in natural science (Section 8). 
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7. The CMT-model compared to other theories.  
 
 A first famous theory to consider is Frankfurt’s ‘hierarchical mesh theory’ of free will (1969, 
1988). In a nutshell, according to this theory an action or choice A is free-willed if it is object of, if it 
meshes with, a ‘second-order volition’ or desire – a higher desire about the first-order desire to do A. Then 
A is really (rationally) desired, in agreement with one’s real self, with one’s second-order (rational) 
desires; in other words A flows from the ‘will one wants’ – a reflective capacity animals likely do not 
have. A priori it seems clear that this model fits well to the CMT-model, at least that it can charitably be 
interpreted in resonance with our model, by noting that second-order volitions are part of the general 
beliefs, worldviews etc. an agent uses to guide and control his or her life and actions. Action A meshes 
with a second-order volition in that it is consciously monitored by (assessed, analyzed etc.) with help of a 
worldview, a belief system, assumptions of life, in other words theories*. So there surely seems place for 
a partial overlap between both models. However it is well known that cases as Trina’s, the brainwashed  
child, are a threat to Frankfurt’s theory (for a recent overview and references, see Griffith 2013, Ch. 4). 
Trina may well act in accordance with higher volitions, really believe in what she does, and therefore be 
entirely free according to Frankfurt’s model – a conclusion most people would disagree with. The CMT 
model solves this problem: Trina is brainwashed and therefore not unconstrained; and she monitors 
(assesses) her deeds through questionable, likely inadequate beliefs. In other words, one could say she has 
a limited form of free will. Next, there is also a well-known infinite-regress problem threatening 
Frankfurt’s theory (why stop at second-order and not include higher-order volitions ?). This problem is 
absent from our model for obvious reasons.  
 A next interesting and influential theory is Wolf’s ‘Reason View’ of free will (1990). Wolf’s is 
also a mesh theory, but whereas in Frankfurt’s model free will is, in a sense, a ‘subjective’ matter (an act 
is free as long as there is a mesh between the agent’s choices and his personal, subjective, higher-level 
desires), Wolf adds that these personal desires should also have a ‘connection with the world outside’  – 
they should have an objective dimension, they should ‘connect with the True and Good’ (Wolf 1990). So, 
in order to have free will, one should have the right, objective reasons to do things, reasons that connect 
to the True and Good. In a sense this theory comes quite close to ours. In our model, we would say that 
an action should be consciously monitored, guided by a (sufficiently) adequate theory*, ethical or other. 
It seems this can be understood in Wolf’s parlance as expressing that the agent should have adequate 
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reasons for her or his act, reasons that ‘connect with the True and Good’, in the sense that they are 
involving, embedded in, backed-up by, adequate theories*. In view of connecting our model with natural 
science, we believe however that ‘adequate theory’ is a more instrumental and precise concept than 
‘adequate reasons’, also to interface with (computer) science, as explained briefly in Section 8 (see notably 
the discussion on how computer science could at least partly emulate consciousness); and we avoid the 
somewhat metaphorical ‘connection with the True and Good’. Furthermore, it has been objected to Wolf’s 
theory that agents can be manipulated or programmed into accessing the True and Good (e.g. Griffith 
2013, Ch. 4). We avoid this problem since we assume that a free-willed act should also be free from 
programmed or external compulsion, via clause (i) in DEF-MBA. But as said, in spirit there is an obvious 
connection between Wolf’s theory and ours. It may be that relying on ‘theories’ and ‘consciousness’ as 
we do, rather than on ‘reasons’ (Wolf) or ‘intelligibility / rationality’ as for instance Walter does (2001), 
is in last analysis a matter of taste (and logical construction of the theory). Still, we submit that the 
variability of free will, our essential starting assumption, is conceptualized most precisely via the concept 
of theory or rather theory*. 
 One of the most debated and complex recent theories on free will is Fischer’s and Ravizza’s 
‘Reasons-Responsiveness View’, putting an emphasis on the ‘guidance-control’ involved in a free act 
(Fischer et al. 2007, Fischer and Ravizza 1998). We will here summarize the essence of this elaborated 
theory in a sketchy matter, and reserve more detailed comparison for further work. In a nutshell, an agent 
has free will if her actions and choices are sensitive to, respond to, reasons, where it is emphasized that 
this reasons-responsiveness should not rely on luck, once in a while, and that it is not responsiveness under 
compulsion or neurotic disorder. Rather, the agent should be responsive to reasons through a systematic 
(cognitive) mechanism that ensures guidance-control over her actions. To make the link with the CMT-
model, first note that the concept of conscious control is explicitly mentioned in our basic starting model, 
the MBA-definition (clause (ii)). The conscious monitoring (analyzing, controlling) of an act via adequate 
beliefs and theories thus seems to imply reasons-responsiveness and guidance-control (or it could be 
construed to imply this). So there is a partial overlap of the theories. However, it seems that Fischer’s and 
Ravizza’s Reasons-Responsiveness View is subject to the same criticism as Frankfurt’s theory: it seems 
to imply that the brainwashed girl Trina steals of her free will, since she may well act from a practical 
reasoning mechanism. This is a worry for this model we are immune against (cf. above). However, the 
comparison between the theories can be made in much more detail, as will plan to show elsewhere. 
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 Finally, Walter (2001) has proposed a 3-component theory of libertarian free will, based on an 
extensive literature review, and with the aim to compare the ingredients of the model to the neuroscientific 
investigations by his and other teams. Again we can only sketchily compare our minimal (2-component) 
model with this much more elaborate theory, but in view of the similar goals this theory is a relevant 
reference. A summary is given in Table 1.1., p. 43 (Walter 2001). Each main ingredient (briefly, 
alternativism; intelligibility / rationality; and agency / origination) can be understood according to 
Walter’s classification in a minimal, moderate or maximal version. Comparison shows in a straightforward 
manner that our CMT-model corresponds to Walter’s alternativism in its minimal interpretation, plus 
intelligibility in its moderate interpretation. However there is a difference: our model does not explicitly 
include agency. But we define the free act of an agent, and therefore agency can be understood as implicit 
in this notion of agent and, especially, as made more explicit by our ‘consciousness’ clause (ii). Genuine 
agency would then correspond to the capacity of a subject to act freely in the sense we define. Clearly, 
there may still be advantages to make agency explicit, in order to investigate certain questions (although 
it may be that this move is more relevant for a libertarian stance). But as said, we wish to present here a 
minimal model.      
 
8. Conclusion. 
 
Before resuming the results presented in this article, let us succinctly indicate some avenues of 
research suggested by the CMT-model in neuroscience and computer science. Of course, within the 
naturalized tradition, we consider it a merit of a philosophical model if it can interface with natural science. 
We conjecture that our model could be instrumental in tackling questions related to consciousness – 
considered an essential but at the same time highly elusive concept in neuroscience (Stern 2017). Notably, 
our model allows to conceptualize some aspects of consciousness and free will that could have an 
empirical basis. We think here in the first place of the process of monitoring by a neuronal superstructure, 
presumably in the prefrontal cortex, that should represent a theory*. We believe it would be interesting to 
search for the neuronal correlates for ‘assumptions’ in primates: one conjectures that they are related to 
memory-circuits, or to the ‘mirror neurons’ that have become fashionable lately9. Next, it would be 
interesting to analyze the well-known Libet experiment through the lens of our model, as we will do 
                                                          
9 It is interesting that these mirror neurons are the base for the ‘theory of mind’ that neurobiologists have attributed to primates 
as the cognitive base for recognizing the ‘self’ and ‘the other’.  
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elsewhere. In IT and computer science, a much debated question is: can future computers and robots 
simulate consciousness and/or free will ? If possible at all, our model suggests that one of the key 
properties a computer should have to emulate consciousness, or to approximately mimic it, is the capacity 
to ‘use’ higher-order theories – and this notably includes the capacity to adequately apply theories to (all) 
real-world situations and to act accordingly. Some will conclude we are very far from this possibility. This 
suggests the following line of research: can machines learn to acquire and use theories*, and which types 
and how ? Interestingly, very recently computer scientists and cognitive scientists have indeed come to 
the conclusion that mastering theories is a key goal for artificial intelligence. In the words of Lake et al. 
(2017, abstract):  
“We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking 
machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn and how 
they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (1) build causal models of the 
world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition 
problems; (2) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology to support and enrich 
the knowledge that is learned; and (3) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly 
acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations.” 
And (Lake et al. 2017, p. 2):  
“The alternative approach [alternative to pattern recognition] treats models of the world as 
primary, where learning is the process of model-building. Cognition is about using these models 
to understand the world, to explain what we see, to imagine what could have happened that didn't, 
or what could be true that isn't, and then planning actions to make it so. The difference between 
pattern recognition and model-building, between prediction and explanation, is central to our view 
of human intelligence. Just as scientists seek to explain nature, not simply predict it, we see human 
thought as fundamentally a model-building activity.”  
    
Our model, then, based on well-known analytic models and on the systematic and wide-ranging 
work on the conceptual foundations of psychobiology by Mahner and Bunge (1997), stipulates that a free 
act is unconstrained (no second agent nor programmed manipulation), and consciously monitored through 
a theory*. It thus highlights the rational aspect of free will. Further we emphasized the fact that free will 
comes in degrees, a hypothesis that seems natural within a biophilosophical approach. We submitted that 
the concept that can most synthetically and precisely address this variability of free will is that of theory* 
– or rather the capacity to use theories*.  
Our model is compatibilist, and appears to be independent of whether the universe is ultimately 
deterministic or indeterministic. If our universe would be deterministic (a hypothesis for which we 
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presented arguments in Vervoort 2013), here is an example of how to apply the CMT-model.  According 
to our compatibilist position the following three facts may be true at the same time: 
  
(i) a murder may be committed by an act of free will (in that the act was unconstrained and 
accompanied by a conscious reflection based on some beliefs, assumptions etc.);  
(ii) but the free will of the murderer is likely to be of a corrupted type (her moral theory* is 
likely not adequate);  
(iii) and at the same time the murder had to happen (in a truly deterministic universe, there are 
no alternatives ‘on the atomic scale’, taking all facts about the universe into account). 
  
An ‘ontic CMT compatibilist’ – someone who assumes both determinism and that humans can have a 
form of free will as construed by the CMT-model – will stipulate that claims (i) and (ii) should not be 
adopted without also considering (iii); that (iii) should seriously be taken into account. Of course, such a 
compatibilist ontology may have weighty, and all but trivial, implications for our philosophy of, and our 
living within, society – maybe notably for our legal, punitive and educational practices. In other words, 
how to apply this type of compatibilist theory seems an extremely complex matter. But one should 
remember that there exist already influential schools of thought that have theorized the values and 
consequences of this ontology. One of the oldest and best-developed is Spinozism. 
 Let us also note that the hypothesis of determinism cannot only be juxtaposed to the hypothesis of 
free will; it can also be linked more directly to the different ingredients of the CMT-model. Notably, the 
theories* that accompany conscious actions are, within a deterministic worldview, acquired by 
determined, necessary processes; their acquisition, interpretation, application etc. may for instance be 
triggered or influenced by upbringing, social background, life-changing encounters – in any particular 
case by a potentially quasi-infinite number of particular causes.  
And yet, within our model there is room for agency, notably through the capacity we have to learn, 
to improve our beliefs and our capacity to act accordingly, to adopt more adequate theories etc.. Our view 
is all but pessimistic or defeatist (Spinoza’s theory is all but defeatist); rather, we interpret it as giving 
directions on how to become “freer”. Namely by making efforts to acquire beliefs, views and theories that 
help us to deal better with this world.   
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